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Abstract—Cloud computing has emerged as a major ICT
trend and has been acknowledged as a key theme of industry
by prominent ICT organisations. However, one of the major
challenges that face the cloud computing concept and its global
acceptance is how to secure and protect the data that is the
property of the user. The geographic location of cloud data
storage centres is an important issue for many organisations and
individuals due to the regulations and laws that require data and
operations to reside in specific geographic locations. Thus, data
owners may need to ensure that their cloud providers do not
compromise the SLA contract and move their data into another
geographic location. This paper introduces an architecture for a
new approach for geographic location assurance, which combines
the proof of storage protocol (POS) and the distance-bounding
protocol. This allows the client to check where their stored data is
located, without relying on the word of the cloud provider. This
architecture aims to achieve better security and more flexible
geographic assurance within the environment of cloud computing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing delivers a huge range of virtual and
dynamically-scalable resources including computation power
and storage to users of Internet technologies. These services
could help private and government organisations to outsource
their data storage to cloud providers. However, most organ-
isations will pay careful consideration to where their data
physically resides if they move to cloud computing. The
majority of the storage service providers claim in the service
level agreement (SLA) that they maintain the data availability
and state that the data will reside only in specific geographic
locations. However, cloud service providers may violate the
SLA by intentionally or accidentally moving their clients’
data into remote data centres that may be located outside
the specified geographic boundaries seeking cheaper IT costs.
For this reason, cloud customers may need to verify that their
data are located in the same geographic location specified at
contract time and make sure that the cloud service provider
continues to meet their geographic location obligations. In
addition, there are certain legislative requirements on data and
operations to remain in certain geographic locations [31], [11].
This paper proposes a new protocol (GeoProof) which
is designed to provide a geographic assurance for the data
owners, that their data remains in the same physical location
specified in the SLA. GeoProof combines the proof of storage
protocol (POS) with the distance-bounding protocol. A POS is
an interactive cryptographic protocol that allows the client to
verify the data without needing to download the whole data.
The distance-bounding protocol is an authentication protocol
between a verifier and a prover, in which the verifier can verify
the claimed identity and physical location of the prover. The
GeoProof protocol combines the POS scheme with a timing
based distance-bounding protocol. Specifically, we employ the
MAC-based variant of the POR of Juels and Kaliski [19] and
time the multi-round challenge-response phase of the protocol
to ensure that the data is close by to the prover. This allows
the client to check where their storage data is located, without
relying on the word of the cloud provider.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: the second
section elucidates the importance of the location assurance;
the third section reviews existing location assurance schemes;
the fourth section overviews POS schemes; the fifth section
introduces the proposed architecture; finally, the sixth section
draws conclusions.
II. WHY LOCATION ASSURANCE?
Critical risks associated with cloud storage services need to
be assessed and managed. In fact, adopting any cloud solution
requires an organisation’s CIO to address some legal questions
such as, where is the cloud provider’s infrastructure physically
located (this includes third parties or sub-contractors) and
where is the data to be stored [31], [11]. The geographic
location of the data has significant effects on its confidentiality
and privacy. This is because any data in the cloud storage
service is located in some physical media which is owned
by someone (cloud provider or subcontractor). This machine
resides in one or more specific countries which have their
own laws and regulations. As a result, the stored data will
be subject to these regulations [17], [20]. Note that certain
regulations and laws require data and operations to reside in
specific geographic locations [10]. For instance, in Australia
it is not allowed by law to transfer any personal information
about individuals across the country borders, unless transferred
to a foreign country that applies legal restrictions similar to
Australia’s National Privacy Principles [3]. Note that regarding
the geographic location of the data, HIPAA, COBIT, ISO
27002 and NIST SP800-53 are important regulations and
standards that the cloud provider needs to comply with [12].
Today, there are some cloud storage providers that offer an
option of a specified geographic location for the data. For
example, Amazon allows its customers to locate and store
their data in the European Union (EU) in order to offer
better performance and meet EU data storage regulations [4].
However, there is no enforcement for location restrictions.
Therefore, cloud providers may trick their clients and may
relocate, either intentionally or accidentally, client’s data in
remote storage. These storage locations could be in undesirable
countries.
III. REVIEW OF LOCATION ASSURANCE
Recently, there has been some literature addressing the issue
of location assurance in the cloud. Peterson et al. presented
a position paper [37] which talks about how to combine a
proof of storage protocol with geolocation, but without giving
any details. Also, Benson et al. [6] discuss how to obtain
assurance that a cloud storage provider replicates the data
in diverse geolocations. Neither of these papers gives any
details regarding usage of distance-bounding protocols or how
to appropriately and securely integrate them into a proof of
storage scheme.
Before looking at proof of storage protocols, we consider
two existing techniques that can be used to verify the geo-
graphic location of a remote host: distance-bounding protocols
and geolocation schemes.
A. Distance-bounding protocols
Figure 1. A general view of distance bounding protocols
A distance-bounding protocol is an authentication protocol
between a verifier V and a prover P, in which V can verify the
claimed identity and physical location of P. This protocol may
be used to monitor the geographic location of the remotely
stored data by measuring the physical distance by timing a
round trip time (RTT) between sending out challenge bits and
receiving back the corresponding response bits. In general,
distance bounding protocol involves two phases: initialisation
phase and distance-bounding phase (Fig. 1). In the initiali-
sation phase both the prover and verifier share a common
secret value s and key K. Also, both sides exchange their
identification and a random nonce N, which will be used
to create their own string. This phase is not time critical.
The distance-bounding phase is time critical and involves a
sequence of challenge-response bit exchanges for a specific
number j (j is a security parameter). The verifier selects j
random challenges (c1, c2, ...cj) and sends them to the prover.
For each sent challenge, the verifier starts the clock. For each
challenge, the prover on the other side generates the responses
(r1, r2, ...rj) and sends them one by one to the verifier. Upon
receiving the response rj , the verifier stops the clock and
calculates the round trip time4tj [5]. The verification process
involves, verifying the response rj and checking that the round
trip time is in the allowed range 4tj ≤ 4tmax.
Brands and Chaum [7] were the first to propose distance-
bounding protocol in order to protect against the mafia fraud
in which the adversary (for both V and P) is sitting between
the real V and P. However, this protocol does not consider the
case when the prover is not trusted (terrorist attack) and may
fool V by allowing a fake prover P˜ that is physically close to
V and can run distance-bounding protocol with V on behalf of
P. According to Reid et al. [39], the first distance-bounding
protocol that provides protection against a terrorist attack
is the one provided by Bussard [8]. However, this protocol
is public-key based and involves expensive computation and
implementation [39].
Hancke and Kuhn [18] introduced a distance-bounding pro-
tocol that is based on a symmetric-key identification method
(Fig. 2). In this protocol, the initialisation phase requires that
both the prover and verifier share a common secret value s
and before they start the distance bounding protocol they need
to exchange random nonces rA and rB . Then a keyed hash
function h is applied to the concatenation of the nonces rA
and rB to get d. After that, d is splitted into two n-bit strings
l and r. The distance-bounding phase then starts by sending
a challenge bit αi. The timing clock then starts and continues
until response from the corresponding bit βi received. The
prover need to respond by ith bit of l if αi = 0, and the ith
bit of r if αi = 1. The verification process includes checking
the received bit βi and checking the round trip time RTT 4ti
is not larger than the allowed time 4tmax. However, Hancke
and Kuhn’s protocol does not consider the relay (terrorist)
attack when the prover P sends a copy of the secret message
s to a closer fake prover P˜ and allows him to run the distance-
bounding protocol with V [39].
Reid et al. [39] enhanced Hancke and Kuhn’s distance-
bounding protocol to protect against terrorist attack. They
made it a requirement to exchange identities of both V and
P in the initialisation phase. In addition, both V and P need to
use the key derivation function KDF to create the encryption
key k, which will be used to encrypt the shared secret message
s (Fig. 3).
In addition, a number of distance-bounding protocols have
been proposed in recent years in order to improve security
levels against distance, mafia and terrorist attacks. Examples
of such protocols include [30], [38], [40], [22], [13], [16], [21],
[29], [43], [32], [36], [24], [25].
However, this type of protocols are a proximity protocol
which relies on very fast wireless communication (e.g. Radio
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Figure 3. Distance bounding protocol of Reid et al. [39]
Frequency (RF) security devices). In fact, the RTT resulting
from this protocol is then divided into twice the speed of light
as these protocols are based on the fact that the travel speed of
radio waves is very similar to the speed of light (300 km/ms).
For this reason, the time latency in them is very sensitive
and any delay introduced will be multiplied by the speed of
light in order to find the distance. Generally speaking, the
timing error of of 1ms corresponds to a distance error of
1ms×300 km/ms
2 = 150 km (divide by 2 as it is RTT ).
In our GeoProof scheme, we will use the basic idea of a
distance-bounding protocol in which the verifier V will time
the RTT from sending the request until receiving the response.
The majority of distance-bounding protocols were designed to
assure the physical location of clients or hosts (machines) and
not the actual stored data. However, in our GeoProof scheme,
we are only concerned about assuring the geographic location
of the data itself. For this reason, we will use the basic idea
of distance-bounding protocol which is the timing phase only
and the exchanged bits are the actual stored data blocks (see
section V-B).
B. Geolocation schemes
Geolocation schemes are another example of timing-based
protocols that are used to triangulate Internet hosts. The com-
munication medium is not Radio Frequency (RF) anymore.
Instead, they are running in Internet media which makes
the location verification very rough. In general, geolocation
schemes could be classified into two types: measurement based
and IP address mapping based [15].
a) Measurement based geolocation: These schemes usu-
ally measure the physical location of a host by measuring
the network delays between server and hosts. In most cases,
these measurements are based on the previous knowledge of
positioning information of trusted reference hosts (landmarks)
that are located close to the host of interest. There are
two types of reference landmarks: real measurements and
servers from experimental labs such as PlanetLab [2]. In fact,
the measurement accuracy of such schemes is dependent on
the number of reference landmarks used [15]. Examples of
measurement based geolocation schemes include:
1) GeoPing [33]: GeoPing locates the required host by
measuring the delay in time between required host and
several known locations. It uses a ready made database
of delay measurements from fixed locations into several
target machines.
2) Octant [45]: Octant is designed to identify the potential
area where the required node may be located. It cal-
culates the network latency between a landmark and a
target and is based on the fact that the speed of light in
fiber is 2/3 the speed of light.
3) Topology Based Geolocation (TBG) [23]: TBG consid-
ers the network topology and the time delay information
in order to estimate the host’s geographic location.
In this scheme, the landmarks issue traceroute probes
to each other and the target. The topology network
information is observed from the entire set of traceroute
from landmarks to other landmarks and from landmarks
to the target.
b) IP address mapping based geolocation: This type of
geolocation scheme relies on the use of the IP address of
the target host and maps its relevant location. These schemes
are based on the DNS names of the host. They predict the
geographic location from the DNS names. However, with var-
ious incomplete and outdated DNS databases, the IP address
mapping is still more challenging [33]. Examples of IP address
mapping based geolocation include:
1) GeoTrack [33]: the first step in GeoTrack is to traceroute
the target host. It then uses the result and identifies all
domain names of intermediate routers on the network
path. After that, Geotrack uses the domain name of these
machines and tries to estimates the geographic location
of this target host by the domain name itself.
2) GeoCluster [33]: the main idea of GeoCluster is to
determine the geographic location of the target hosts
by using the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing
information. Then, GeoCluster estimates the geographic
location by combining the the BGP information with its
IP-to-location mapping information.
In general, most of the geolocation techniques lack accuracy
and flexibility. For instance, most provide location estimates
with worst-case errors of over 1000 km [23]. In addition, these
schemes are used to determine the location of multiple hosts,
but in our case (cloud) we only focus to assure the location
of one server (the data storage if we assume that the data
is in one machine and not distributed). Most importantly, all
known geolocation schemes have weak security as they do
not consider the adversarial target and do not assume that the
prover (cloud provider) is malicious. In our research we are
interested in locating the data in the Internet and do consider
the host as malicious. Our key objective is that using GeoProof
we can verify that given data resides in a specific location.
IV. PROOF OF STORAGE (POS)
Proof of storage (POS) protocols are a key component in
most secure cloud storage proposals in the literature. A POS is
an interactive cryptographic protocol that is executed between
clients and storage providers in order to prove to the clients
that their data has not been altered or modified by the providers
[20]. So, it allows the client to verify the data without the need
of having the data in the client side. The POS protocol will
be executed every time a client wants to verify the integrity of
the stored data. A key property of POS protocols is that the
size of the information exchanged between client and server is
very small and may even be independent of the size of stored
data [10].
There are many POS schemes that have been proposed for
this purpose. For instance, Juels and Kaliski [19] introduced
proof of retrievability (POR). In POR the Encode algorithm
firstly encrypts all the data. Additionally, a number of random-
valued blocks (sentinels) are inserted at randomly chosen
positions within the encrypted data. Finally, an error correction
code is applied to the resulting new data. Clients Challenge
the service provider by identifying the positions of a subset
of sentinels and asking the service provider to retrieve the
requested values. The VerifyProof process relies on the high
probability that if the service provider modifies any portions
of the data, the modification will include some of the sentinels
and will therefore be detected. If the damage is so small that
it does not affect any sentinel, then it can be reversed using
error correction. Moreover, Juels and Kaliski [19] indicate that
it is possible to use message-authentication codes (MACs) and
apply these to (selected) file blocks instead of sentinels. This
is very similar to the idea of a sentinel-based scheme.
In GeoProof and for simplicity, we will use the idea of
the MAC based POR scheme by Juels and Kaliski [19] (see
section V-A). The Juels and Kaliski [19] scheme is designed
to deal with the static data but GeoProof could be modified to
encompass other POS schemes that support verifying dynamic
data such as dynamic proof of retrievability (DPOR) by Wang
et al. [44].
V. PROPOSED GEOPROOF ARCHITECTURE
The main idea of the GeoProof protocol is to combine the
POS scheme with a timing based distance-bounding protocol.
Specifically, we employ the MAC-based variant of the POR
of Juels and Kaliski [19] and time the multi-round challenge-
response phase of the protocol to ensure that the data is close
by to the prover.
Figure 4. Proposed GeoProof Architecture
In this proposed GeoProof scheme a device (GPS enabled
to ensure physical location of this device) will be attached to
the local network of the service provider. We assume that this
device is tamper proof which means no one can modify this
device including the service provider. This device will be used
to run the distance-bounding protocol with the distributed data
centres. A third party auditor (TPA) communicates with this
device in order to assure the geographic location on behalf of
the data owner. The TPA knows the secret key used to verify
the MAC tags associated to the data. The tamper proof device,
which we called the verifier (Fig. 4) has a private key which it
uses to sign the transcript of the distance bounding protocol,
together with some additional data, which is then sent to the
TPA.
A. Setup phase
As in the POR [19], the data file is prepared before it is sent
to the cloud storage. The setup process involves five steps as
follows:
1) The file F is divided into blocks F = {B1, B2, ....Bn}
with a specific block size `B = |Bi|. Following the
example given in [19], `B = 128 bits; as it is the size
of an AES block.
2) Then, blocks in F are grouped into k-block chunks and
for each chunk of blocks an error correction code is
applied resulting in F ′. Reed-Solomon error correcting
codes are suitable for this purpose. As in [19], for the
purpose of this research, we consider the adapted (255,
223, 32)-Reed-Solomon code over GF [2128]. The chunk
size in this code is 255 blocks. This step increases the
original size of the file by about 14%.
3) The updated file F ′ is encrypted using a symmetric-key
cipher and the result is F ′′ = EK(F ′).
4) The next step is to reorder the blocks of F ′′ using a
pseudorandom permutation (PRP) [28]. The result from
this step is the file F ′′′.
5) The final step in the setup phase is to use the MAC. The
file F ′′′ is divided into sequentially indexed segments
of v blocks (e.g. v = 5 blocks); {S1, S2, ....Sn}. For
each segment, the MAC is computed as follows: τi =
MACK′ (Si, i, fid); where i is the segment index and
fid is the file ID. For example, the size of the MAC
block can be 20 bits. Note that the protocol involves the
verification of many tags, hence the output size can be
small. Lastly, each segment is embedded with its MAC
and the result is the file F˜ ready to be stored in the cloud.
Based on the assumption of `B = 128 bits, v = 5 and
`τ = 20 bits; the segment size will be `S = (128×5)+
20 = 660 bits.
B. GeoProof protocol
In GeoProof protocol (Fig. 5), the verifier V sends a large
file F˜ that consists of set of segments (S1, S2, ....Sn˜) to the
prover P (cloud). Each segment Si is associated with its tag
value τi. GeoProof protocol is started when the TPA sends the
total number of segments n˜ of F˜ , the number of segments to be
checked k, and a random nonce N to the verifier (V). The veri-
fier V then, generates the challenge message c, which is simply
a random set of indexes c = {c1, c2, ...., ck} ⊆ {1, 2, ...., n}.
Then the distance-bounding protocol is run between V and
P consisting of k rounds. For j = 1 to k, V sends the
index cj and starts the timing clock 4tj . When P receives
the request it starts the look up process for this block and
responds by sending back the data segment Scj ||τcj . Let the
time taken for looking up the specific block be 4tLj . Upon
receiving the response, V stops the timing clock and the time
taken for this trip is 4tj = 4tV Pj + 4tLj ; where 4tV Pj
is the actual round trip travelling time between V and P
without the look up time. After running the distance-bounding
protocol for k times, V signs the following data using its
private key SK and sends it back to A. This includes the time
values 4t = {4t1,4t2, ...,4tk}, the challenge message c,
all requested segments with its tags embedded in it {Scj}j=1j=k,
the nonce N , and V’s GPS position Posv (Fig. 5).
a) Example: Assume that we have a 2 gigabyte file F
that we want to store in the cloud. Let us say that the ideal
block size is `B = 128 bits as it is the size of an AES block.
Then, F is divided into b = 227 blocks. Then, for each chunk
of data (255 blocks) we apply an error correction code. This
will expand the file size by at least 14% and the size of the
new file F ′ equals b′ = 153, 008, 209 blocks [19]. Then the
file F ′ is encrypted (F ′′ = EK(F ′)). After that, we apply
the permutation function on file F ′′ and produce F ′′′. The
last step is the MACing process in which F ′′′ is divided into
sequentially indexed segments with a size of 5 blocks. With
a 20-bit MAC, the incremental file expansion due to MACing
would be only 2.5%. In total, the space overhead resulting
from both error correction and MACing is about 16.5%.
b) Verification process: The TPA (A) does the verifica-
tion process which involves the following steps:
1) Verify the signature SignSK(R).
2) Verify V’s GPS position Posv .
3) Check that τcj =MACK(Scj , cj , fid) for each cj .
4) Find the maximum time4t′ = max(4t1,4t2, ...,4tk)
and check that 4t′ ≤ 4tmax. 4tmax depends on the
latency characteristics of the network and computing
equipment as is further discussed in section V-D and
section V-E.
C. Security analysis
a) Integrity assurance: Juels and Kaliski [19] provide a
detailed analysis of the probability of the prover compromising
the integrity of the file without being detected. Based on the
example parameters discussed above, if an adversary corrupts
1/2% of the data blocks of the file, then the probability
that the adversary could make the file irretrievable is less
than 1 in 200, 000. In POR the detection of file corruption
is a cumulative process. Assume that we have a file with
1, 000, 000 segments embedded and the verifier can query
1, 000 segments in each challenge. Based on [19], POR pro-
tocol provides a high probability (about 71.3%) of detecting
adversarial corruption of the file in each challenge.
b) Distance-bounding assurance: According to the dis-
cussion in sections V-D and V-E, we may consider an ac-
ceptable upper-bound for the round trip delay 4tV P of 3ms,
and a maximum look up time 4tL of 13ms. As a result, the
expected round trip time for a packet to travel between V and
P must be less than 4tmax ≈ 16 ms.
Figure 6. Relay Attack
We can categorise hard disks into two types: best hard disks
with very low look up time 4tLB , and worst hard disks with
high look up time 4tLW ; where4tLB  4tLW . Assume
an attack scenario in which the cloud provider is trying to
move the stored data into a fraud P˜ which is accessible via
the Internet. In this scenario, P is not involved in any look up
process, it just passes any request from V into P˜ . In addition,
assume that the remote data centres run high performance hard
disks with very low look up time 4tLB ' 5.406ms corre-
sponding to a HDD of IBM (36Z15); as discussed in section
V-D. Moreover, assume that an upper-bound for the speed of
the Internet of 49 the speed of light; as discussed in section
V-F. Then the maximum distance between the verifier and the
remote data centres is 49 3×102 km/ms×5.406 ms = 720 km/2
(for the round trip) = 360 km.
Figure 5. GeoProof Protocol
In practice, this number is much smaller for many reasons.
For instance, it is unlikely that the service provider would
want to invest a lot of money to place the data in a remote
data centre with such high performance and required high
budget. Furthermore, these measurements could be made at
the contract time at the place where the data centre is located
and could be based on the concrete settings of the data centre
and the characteristics of the data centre (e.g. LAN latency and
look up latency). Thus, we identify the acceptable time delay
and these measurements could be tested every time using our
proposed GeoProof protocol.
We assume that the verifier V is GPS enabled, and we need
to rely on the GPS position of this device. However, the GPS
signal may be manipulated by the provider. In fact, the GPS
satellite simulators can spoof the GPS signal by producing a
fake satellite radio signal that is much stronger than the normal
GPS signal. The GPS receivers can be spoofed by these fake
signals [9]. Thus, for extra assurance we may want to verify
the position of V. This is easier than verifying the position
of P, because we trust that V will follow the protocol. For
better accuracy, we could consider the triangulation of V from
multiple landmarks [41]. This may include some challenges as
the verifier is located in the same network that is controlled
by the prover, thus the attacker may introduce delays to the
communication paths between these multiple auditors.
D. Hard disk latency
Hard disk drives (HDD) are used on the cloud provider
side to store the client’s data. The most important issue that
determines the performance of HDD is the rotational speed of
the platters (RPM) [34], [14], [42]. The look up latency 4tL
is composed of three determinants [14]: the seek time 4tseek,
rotational latency 4trotate and data transfer time 4ttransfer.
4tL = 4tseek +4trotate +4ttransfer
1) 4tseek: is the time that the HDD takes to position the
proper sector under the read/write head.
2) 4trotate: is the rotational latency which is the waiting
time needed by the disk head to spin the disk platter
until it arrives to the first required sector.
3) 4ttransfer: is the data transfer time and it is composed
of two variables. The first one is the Internal Data Rate
(IDR) which is the transfer rate between the disk storage
media and the disk cache. The second variable is the
External Data Rate(EDR), which is the transfer rate
between the disk cache and the memory. In general,
IDR is the one usually used for measuring the HDD
data transfer rate.
Type IBM
36Z15
IBM
73LZX
WD
2500JD
IBM
40GNX
Hitachi
DK23DA
RPM 15,000 10,000 7,200 5,400 4,200
avg(4tseek) ms 3.4 4.9 8.9 12 13
avg(4trotate) ms 2 3 4.2 5.5 7.1
avg(IDR) Mb/s 55 53 93.5 25 ~ 34.7
Table I
LATENCY FOR DIFFERENT HDD [14]
Table I shows the RPM and latency for five different HDD.
It is clear that the RPM has a significant effect on the look
up latency 4tL where the higher the RPM speed, the lower
the look up latency. However, the high increase in RPM of
the disk drives is associated with other problems such as high
temperature, power consumption, noise and vibration.
In the cloud computing environment, we assume that the
cloud storage provider is using an average HDD in terms of
RPM; for example the Western Digital (WD2500JD). This
product has characteristics of 7, 200 RPM, the seek time
4tseek is 8.9ms, the rotational latency 4trotate is 4.2ms,
and the internal transfer time of 512 bytes is 4ttransfer =
512×8
748×103 = 5.48 × 10−3ms; where 748 is the media transfer
rate. Thus the average look up latency 4tL = 4tseek +
4trotate + 4ttransfer = 8.9 + 4.2 + 5.48 × 10−3 =
13.1055ms.
Consider a case where the cloud storage provider may want
to deceive his clients and store the data in remote storage in
order to save money (the relay attack scenario). We assume
that the remote storage devices use an improved HDD in terms
of RPM; for example IBM (36Z15). The seek time 4tseek
is 3.4ms, the rotational latency 4trotate is 2ms, and the
internal transfer time of 512 bytes is 4ttransfer = 512×8647×103 =
6.33× 10−3ms; where 647 is the media transfer rate . Thus,
the average look up latency 4tL = 4tseek + 4trotate +
4ttransfer = 3.4 + 2 + 6.33× 10−3 = 5.406ms .
E. LAN latency
In our GeoProof scheme, the verifier V is assumed to be
placed in the same local network of the cloud provider P (Fig.
4). This assumption will help to eliminate the Internet latency.
Thus, the only network latency is expected from the Local
Area Network (LAN) and such delay is affected by the wiring
media used and the switching equipments used in between.
According to Percacci et al. [35], Wong et al. [45] and Katz-
Bassett et al.[23], digital information can travel in the optic
fibre cables at a speed of 2/3 the speed of light in a vacuum.
So, if the optic fibre is used for cabling the network in the
LAN, then we expect that the data packet will travel at the
speed of: SLAN = 23 × 3× 105 km/s = 200 km/ms. This means
that the round trip time (RTT) needed for a packet to travel in
LAN between V and P 4tV P is about 1ms within the range
of 200 km.
The most common method of networking workstations in
LAN is the Ethernet which uses copper cabling. The speed of
the common Ethernet ranges from 100 Mbps for Fast Ethernet
and 1000 Mbps for Gigabit Ethernet [26]. In general, there
are two types of time delays in Ethernet: the propagation time
delay which depends on the physical length of the network and
the transmission time delay which depends on the message size
[27]. In the worst case scenario, the propagation time delay
for the Ethernet is about 0.0256ms. Lian et al. [27] indicate
that the “Ethernet has almost no delay at low network loads”.
For more justification, we ran a small experiment within
the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) network. The
experiment aim was to run the traceroute (ping) command for
different workstations with different destinations within the
QUT’s network. Table II indicates that the LAN latency in
QUT’s network is less than 1ms in most cases.
Machine# Location Distance (km) Latency (ms)
1 Same level 0 < 1
2 Same level 0.01 < 1
3 Same level 0.02 < 1
4 Same Campus 0.5 < 1
5 Other Campus 3.2 < 1
6 Same Campus 0.5 < 1
7 Other Campus 3.2 < 1
8 Other Campus 45 < 1
9 Other Campus 3.2 < 1
10 Other Campus 3.2 < 1
Table II
LAN LATENCY WITHIN QUT
For simplicity, in our proposed GeoProof scheme, we as-
sumed that the LAN latency is about 1 ms. However, the
previous calculations do not consider the delay that may
result within the LAN network from switching equipments.
To remedy this problem, we may ask the cloud provider to
place the verifier V very close to the data storage.
F. Internet latency
The data packet travelling in the Internet could face high
time delays due to the huge amount of infrastructure used. In
fact, this delay has a direct correlation with the distance; as
the distance increased, the time delay increased. According to
Katz-Bassett et al. [23], the speed of Internet is nearly 49 the
speed of light; i.e. 49 3× 102 km/ms . So, in 3ms, a packet can
travel via the Internet for a distance of: 49 3 × 102 km/ms ×
3 ms = 400km/2 (for the round trip) = 200km.
The previous measurement was done in the US and may
not necessarily translate to other parts of the Internet and in
fact our preliminary investigation indicates that is not the case.
Table III shows the Internet Latency within Australia. We used
the traceroute command to measure the RTT between a host
located in Brisbane and some other hosts around Australia.
The physical distance between each pair of hosts was mea-
sured using the online “Google Maps Distance Calculator”
[1]. We found that there is a positive relationship between the
physical distance and the Internet latency. Thus, as the physical
distance increased the time delay increased.
URL Location ADSL2, Brisbane (AU)
Dist.(km)† Latency (ms)
uq.edu.au Brisbane (AU) 8 18
qut.edu.au Brisbane (AU) 12 20
une.edu.au Armidale (AU) 350 26
sydney.edu.au Sydney (AU) 722 34
jcu.edu.au Townsville (AU) 1120 39
mh.org.au Melbourne (AU) 1363 42
rah.sa.gov.au Adelaide (AU) 1592 54
utas.edu.au Hobart (AU) 1785 64
uwa.edu.au Perth (AU) 3605 82
Table III
INTERNET LATENCY WITHIN AUSTRALIA
†Physical distance is calculated using “Google Maps Distance Calculator” [1]
VI. CONCLUSION
Security is a major challenge for cloud computing providers.
Geographic assurance is an example of a significant security
issue in the cloud environment. This is due to the fact that
some countries have flexible laws and regulations that may
affect the confidentiality and privacy of the stored data. Thus,
data owners may need to make sure that their cloud providers
do not compromise the SLA contract and move their data
into another geographic location. We propose our GeoProof
protocol, which combines the proof of storage protocols and
distance-bounding protocols, in order to provide an assurance
for the geographic location in the cloud environment.
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